Prof. Dr. Michael Finus

Books

Der Reisekostenansatz – Darstellung, methodische Probleme und Anwendungsmöglichkeiten. "Materialien des Zentrums für regionale Entwicklungsforschung der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen", vol. 24, Gießen, 1992.
Modellstudie zu umweltrelevanten Informationen aus der Agrarstatistik. "Studien des Zentrums für regionale Entwicklungsforschung der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen", Gießen, 1994 (with G. Correll, C. Hagner and R. Herrmann).
Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation, 2001, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. Book Leaflet
Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice, 2002, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK (with Christoph Böhringer and Carsten Vogt).
The Economics of International Environmental Problems. Interdisciplinary Course „Umweltwissenschaften infernum“. Edited in collaboration between „Frauenhofer Institut Umwelt-, Sicherheits- und Energietechnik Umsicht“ and University of Hagen, 2002
(with A. Endres).
Umweltökonomie Arbeits- und Übungsbuch. Verlag Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2007
(with R. Bertram, A. Endres and B. Rundshagen).

Journal Articles

Ansätze zur Messung des Wertes von Umweltgütern in der Landwirtschaft – Methodische Grundlagen. Agrarwirtschaft, vol. 41, 1992, pp. 367-374.
Zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie der Umweltgesetzgebung – Umweltschutzinstrumente im politischen Prozeß. "Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung", vol. 8, pp. 88-103, 1996 (with A. Endres).
Playing a Better Global Warming Game: Does it Help to be Green? "Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics", vol. 134, pp. 21-40, 1998 (with A. Endres).
PDF-File: paper
Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient. "Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics", vol. 12, pp. 275-306, 1998 (with B. Rundshagen).
PDF-File: paper
Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control. "Public Choice", vol. 96, pp. 145-186, 1998 (with B. Rundshagen).
PDF-File: paper
International Environmental Agreements: How the Policy Instrument Affects Equilibrium Emissions and Welfare. "Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics", vol. 155, pp. 527-550, 1999 (with A. Endres).
PDF-File: paper
Symbolische Umweltpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung – Zur Effektivität internationaler Umweltverträge aus ökonomischer Sicht. "Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik", vol. 1, pp. 73-91, 2000 (with A. Endres and F. Lobigs).
Kooperative Lösung in der Umweltpolitik: Eine ökonomische Analyse am Beispiel des Schutzes der Globalen Umweltressourcen. Study ("Ansätze zur Herbeiführung von Verhandlungslösungen im Bereich der globalen Umweltpolitik") for the Advisory Body "Global Environmental Change" to the German Government. "Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung" (ZAU), special edition 12/2000 (with A. Endres).
Warum haben marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente im internationalen Umweltschutz kaum eine Chance? "Zeitschrift für Konjunkturpolitik", vol. 46, 2000, pp. 303-326 (with A. Endres).
Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game. "International Journal of Tax and Public Finance", vol. 9, 2002, pp. 687-707 (with A. Endres).
The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: The Great Leap Forward? "Journal of Public Economics", vol. 87, 2003, pp. 2031-2048 (with S. Tjøtta).
The Effect of Membership Rules and Voting Schemes on the Success of International Climate Agreements. Forthcoming in: "Public Choice" (with J.-C. Altamirano-Cabrera and E. van Ierland).
Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making. Forthcoming in: "Natural Resource Modeling" (with J. Eyckmans).
Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements. Forthcoming in: "Journal of Applied Economics" (with J.-C. Altamirano-Cabrera).
Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game. Forthcoming in: "Economics of Governance" (with E. van Ierland and R. Dellink).
Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation. Forthcoming in: “Natural Resource Modeling” (with B. Rundshagen).
Sanktionen zur Durchsetzung von Vertragspflichten in internationalen Umweltabkommen: Spieltheoretische und praktische Überlegungen. Forthcoming in: „Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht“ (with O. Herzog).
The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Coalitions. Forthcoming in: Oxford Economic Papers (with H.-P. Weikard and J.-C. Altamirano-Cabrera).
A Micro-Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality Coalition Games. Forthcoming in: „Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics“ (with B. Rundshagen).
New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming. Forthcoming in: “Environmental Economics and Policy Studies” (with J. Eyckmans).
Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements. “Review of International Organizations”, vol. 1 (4), 2006, pp. 379-396 (with C. Carraro and
J. Eyckmans)
Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties. Forthcoming in: “International Environmental Agreements” (with J. Eyckmans).
Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement. Working Paper No. 98.2005, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy. Accepted with minor revision in “Journal of Environmental and Resource Economics” (with R. Dellink and N. Oliemann).
Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions? Working Paper in Economics No. 383, University of Hagen, Germany, 2006. Accepted with minor revision in “The Manchester School” (with R. Dellink and J.C. Altamirano-Cabrera).
The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts? Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, vol. 1, 2008, pp. 13-25.
An Empirical Test of New Developments in Coalition Theory for the Design of International Environmental Agreements. Forthcoming: Environment and Development Economics (with M.E. Sáiz and E.M.T. Hendrix).
Modesty May Pay. Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pp. 801-826 (with S. Maus).
Membership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in Positive Externality Games. Forthcoming: Social Choice and Welfare (with B. Rundshagen).

Contributions to collected editions

Umweltpolitische Zielbestimmung im Spannungsfeld gesellschaftlicher Interessengruppen: Ökonomische Theorie und Empirie. In: Siebert, H. (ed.), Elemente einer rationalen Umweltpolitik. Expertisen zur umweltpolitischen Neuorientierung. J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, pp. 35 - 133, 1996 (with A. Endres).
The Role of Environmental Awareness in International Pollution Control – An Economic Analysis. In: Kaufmann-Hayoz, R. and U. Haefeli (eds.), Ökologisierungsprozesse in Wirtschaft und Verwaltung, No. 3/4, Proceedings of the Symposium "Responsible Environmental Behavior", September 4-6, 1996, Bern, pp. 74-82, 1997 (with A. Endres).
Eine spieltheoretische Betrachtung internationaler Umweltprobleme: Eine Einführung. In: Hampicke, U. and H. Nutzinger (eds.), Jahrbuch "Ökonomie und Gesellschaft", No. 14: Nachhaltigkeit in der ökonomischen Theorie, Campus, 1997, pp. 239-300.
Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in a Bargaining Game over Global Emission Reductions – Does the Instrumental Framework Matter? In: Hanley, N. and H. Folmer (eds.), Game Theory and the Global Environment, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, ch. 7,
pp. 135-164, 1998 (with A. Endres).
Warum haben marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente im internationalen Umweltschutz kaum eine Chance? In: Rengeling, H.-W. and H. Hof (eds.), Instrumente des Umweltschutzes im Wirkungsverbund. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 309-325, 2001 (with A. Endres).
EOLSS-Level Writing in Financial Resource Policy and Management: Strategic Aspects of Implementing the International Agreement on Climate Change. In: Tolba, M.K. (ed.), Our Fragile World: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development, Vol. II, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, 2001, pp. 2075-2088 (with A. Endres and B. Rundshagen).
Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical Application? In: Böhringer, C., M. Finus and C. Vogt (eds.), Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2002, ch. 2, pp. 9-104.
Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Transboundary Pollution. In: Folmer, H. and T. Tietenberg (eds.), International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2003/4, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2003, ch. 3, pp. 82-158.
Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control: A Partition Function Approach. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2003, ch. 6, pp. 199-243 (with B. Rundshagen).
New Developments in Coalition Theory: An Application to the Case of Global Pollution. In: Marsiliani, L., M. Rauscher and C. Withagen (eds.), Environmental Policy in an International Perspective, Kluwer, Dordrecht, Holland, 2003, pp. 19-49.
International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems. In: Welfare Economics of Sustainable Development from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK, ch. 1.21.4.3, 2004.
The Kyoto Protocol: Success or Failure? In: Helm, D. (ed.), Climate-change Policy, Oxford Economic Press, Oxford, UK, ch. 12, pp. 253-281, 2005 (with C. Böhringer).
Environmental Economics: How to Reach Agreement? Forthcoming in: Hagedorn, K., U.J. Nagel and M. Odening (eds.), Umwelt- und Produktqualität im Agrarbereich, Tagungsband der 44. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaus e.V. (with E. van Ierland and R. Dellink).
Possibilities for Cooperation in International Pollution Control. Forthcoming in: Cognoy, M. and K.W. Steininger (eds.), The Economics of Global Environmental Change International Cooperation for Sustainability, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K.
An Empirical Assessment of Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties. CLIMNEG Working Paper No. 61, University of Leuven (K.U.L.), Belgium, 2004 (with J. Eyckmans). Forthcoming (2008): Tulkens, H. and R. Guesnerie (eds.), The Design of Climate Policy, MIT Press.

07.12.2009

FernUniversität in Hagen, LST VWL, insb. Wirtschaftstheorie, 58084 Hagen, Tel.: +49 2331 987-4451