“How to deal with socio-ethnic conflicts in Latin America?

Analysing conditions on multiple levels with fsQCA”

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1. Introduction

After (re-)democratization, many countries in Latin American have witnessed an increasing politization of citizens’ ethnic identity. Hence, from the early 1990s some states attempted to respond to demands to strengthen the societal and political inclusion of their indigenous and afro-descendant citizens, f.i. by granting collective rights, such as autonomy provisions, ethnic quotas or consultation mechanisms. Nevertheless, up to now, in many countries of the region, punctual instances of political protest, but also violent incidents occur that primarily involve ethnic minorities as central actors, many times in alliance with other marginalized societal groups. This kind of events manifests that ethnic minority groups are nowadays at the center of societal conflicts that may determine the transformation of Latin American states fundamentally (Cleary 2000, Ernst 2011, Madrid 2012, Martí y Puig 2010).

Although the degree of ethnic diversity varies from country to country, furthermore, ethnic cleavages very commonly overlap with social cleavages: This means, in many countries, indigenous and afro-descendant groups also belong to the poorest segments of society (Hall/Patrinos 2006). This fact raises the potential for violent domestic conflict in the region additionally (Thorp/Paredes 2008).

The aim of our research project is to explain the way societal conflicts are conducted in Latin America – by force or peacefully (our outcome). We start with the assumption that domestic conflicts can only be regulated non-violently, if there are adequate institutionalized instruments assuring citizens’ participation. In particular, we build upon a model by Stoiber (2011) to assess the adequacy of the present institutional design with the given societal context of a country. Democratic mechanisms for regulating ethno-social conflicts may be feasible for instance in form of autonomy arrangements, proportional representation or consensus mechanisms at the macro-level. In addition to this central institutional factor, we consider further variables as relevant for ensuring non-violent conflict regulation. An effective usage of existing institutionalized input-opportunities is assumed to be a prerequisite, too: This step requires analyzing the features of relevant intermediary organizations (meso-level conditions), that channel conflicting interests into the political system, and their impact on decision-making processes, as well as constraining informal structures, such as clientelism and patronage. Finally, also citizens’ attitudes toward public institutions and their motives of action are relevant (micro-level conditions).

To evaluate the conjoint effects of these conditions on our macro-level outcome (way of conflict regulation) a fsQCA shall be applied for 14 Latin American countries. For a systematic comparison of a medium-N-sample of countries QCA offers an ideal instrument to deal with the complexity of features and investigate causality. The combinatory logic of QCA...
and the opportunity of tracing equifinal causal paths (Ragin 1987) seem to be reasonable analytical devices to account for the complexity of factors and involved causal patterns leading to our outcome. Within QCA there are different options that can be chosen according to the requirements of the research design. For our purpose a fsQCA seems to be best suited to do justice to the complexity of our conditions and our outcome.

Our paper is built up as follows: Firstly, we present our theoretical background and our model to explain the way conflicts are dealt with. In the following chapter, we explain our rationale of choosing a fsQCA as an adequate method of analysis and discuss two different models of conducting a QCA that present two alternative ways conceivable for working on our research question, each one emphasizing particular features of the explanatory model. Finally, we provide an outlook on how to calibrate our conditions best, based on our main concepts and recorded raw data.

2. Theoretical and conceptual background

Our research guiding assumption that effective democratic participation will serve as a peaceful means to conflict solution is a commonly shared approach in peace and conflict studies (Hegre et al 2001; Ross 1998). For Latin America Cleary has shown that stable democratic countries have to deal with less violent rebellions, since institutional mechanisms exist that may channel demands made by societal groups (Cleary 2000: 1150; Machado et al. 2011, Lamla 2008: 218; Brysk/Wise 1997: 88ff).

In this context not only the introduction of democracy is important, but the democratic institutions have to correspond to the societal context of the country. Our research is based on a model to measure democratic quality (Stoiber 2011). Instead of assessing democratic quality in general, we will apply the model to define appropriate participation structures according to different ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. We focus on the input side of a political system. The basic theoretical argument is that effective, functioning input-structures will lead to effective political outcomes (Dahl 1989: 175; Stoiber 2011: 140).

Further problems for democracy arise in heterogeneous societies, since majoritarian rule and minimal democratic institutions are not sufficient to cope with the situation. (Lane 1996: 245) Minorities\(^1\) are in risk to end up in a permanent minority position and might therefore turn to violence.

Our considerations are based on an individualistic-liberal concept of democracy, with the focus on the effective participation by individuals in processes of collective decision-making: “Democracy looks to secure individual freedom and equality. It is the extension of individual self-determination into the arena of collective decisions; it is enacted by individuals participating effectively in decisions which affect them.” (Stoiber 2011: 113 (transl. in Stoiber/ Knoedt/ Heinelt 2012))

\(^1\) While it is hard to determine a minority, for our project we will rely on the definition of United Nations Special Rapporteur on the minorities subcommission of the UN Human Rights Committee, Francesco Capotorti. According to Capotorti a minority is: “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” (Capotorti 1977)
Unlike most of liberal political theory, Will Kymlicka has argued that a liberal understanding of democracy is compatible with minority rights (Kymlicka 1995: 108). Minority rights could be various self-government rights or special representation rights. These rights have to be designed according to the context of the respective country. Territorial autonomy in the sense of federalism is the ideal structure for certain regions where a national minority is a regional majority (Kymlicka 1995: 28, 1999: 33) Minority groups that have no regional majority can best be integrated through functional majority that grants self-government functions in the area of cultural rights (see figure 1). As an alternative to autonomies veto rights can be installed in areas that are constitutive for the cultural identity of the minority (Goodin 1996: 639; for the EU: Abromeit 1998: 103 ff.).

For the political representation Kymlicka has argued in favor of a proportional voting system with as low a representation threshold as possible. When minorities are socially and economically in a disadvantaged position Kymlicka argues that formal equality of opportunities is not sufficient. Instead secure representation, e.g. a fixed number of parliamentary seats guarantee the input of minorities in the political process (Kymlicka 1995: 32; figure 1).

Arend Lijphart devoted his research to the situation of segmented societies. Within a segmented society system stability is endangered, if the democracy is based on a majority system. Lijphart (1989) instead argues in favor of consociational democracy, where power sharing is required. Consensus mechanisms like qualified majorities or even supermajorities would ensure that all actors of society are involved in decision-making. For empirical research Lipset/Rokkan's (1959) concept of cleavage structures can be applied. Regarding this concept the exceptions for qualified majorities are conflicts between the centre and the periphery, which can best be solved by means of autonomy rights for the periphery. There are various options to produce consensus and qualified majorities at the national level and they are formalized to differing degrees (cf. Stoiber/Knodt/Heinelt 2012: 430).

These considerations lead to a scheme that can be visualized as follows:

Figure 1: Appropriate participation structures for heterogenous societies

(Source: Stoiber/ Knodt/ Heinelt 2012: 431)
3. Explaining the way conflicts are dealt with

These theoretical considerations are central for our model to explain the way conflicts in heterogeneous societies in Latin America are dealt with. We will look at a total of 14 countries that differ in ethnic fragmentation and socio-economic inequality. This societal context determines the potential for conflict (see figure 2).

In a first step we have to evaluate the participation structures of each country from a macro perspective. We have to develop appropriate participation structures from the ethnic and socio-economic context of each country. Having identified the ideal set of participation structures for each country, we are able to evaluate the existing participation structures. The constitutions of Latin America show multicultural elements to a different extent (Van Cott 2000; Stoiber/Knodt/Heinelt 2012). So called “new constitutionalism”, the phenomenon of new recent and frequent changes in constitutions, has led to the implementation of cultural and political rights as well as the decentralization of administration and decision-making.

But the mere existence of these participation structures is not sufficient. Instead their effective usage needs to be taken into account as well. The quality of democracy varies among the Latin American states. Informal practices like nepotism, clientelism and corruption are a common phenomenon and restrain the possibility to make use of participation structures (Lauth 2004).

Furthermore, the organizational strength of civil society is important, especially in states where democracy is consolidating. (vgl. Zinecker 2005: 537f.) Citizens’ interests can only be channeled into the political sphere if effective intermediary organizations exist (Rucht 1991: 5-7). Intermediary organizations can be parties, social movements or associations, each of which differs according to its linkage with civil society and the political sphere (Rucht 1991: 10). As Schmitter and Streeck argue with respect to business associations, intermediary organizations follow two different logics: membership logic and influence logic (Schmitter/ Streeck 1999: 19). Accordingly, intermediary organizations for minorities are needed that are able to transfer the interests of the minority into the political system.

Research shows that a widespread trust in democratic institutions among citizens is a requirement for the consolidation and stabilization of democracies (Merkel 2010, research for the Latin American region by Seligson/Booth 2009; Ames/Smith 2009; Salinas/Booth 2011). The yearly surveys of Latinobarómetro (since 1995) and Americas Barometer (since 2004) offer extensive data on the citizens' attitudes towards democracy and public institutions. Concerning our research question these data may be used to assess how present institutional mechanisms for conflict regulation are viewed by the population. A first assessment of indigenous participation and trust in democracy has shown that in Bolivia the introduction of indigenous participation structures in fact correlates with a higher satisfaction with democratic institutions (Inguanzo 2011).
4. Designing a QCA

Our analysis is based on a medium-N-sample of 14 Latin American countries. These countries share relevant context features (f.i. type of colonial history, ethnic diversity, regional factors) and a minimum of democratic quality. Countries that do not have any significant share of ethnic minorities (f.i. Uruguay) and that are too small (f.i. Guyana) were excluded from the common sample of all Latin American countries.

Importantly, time has to be considered as central for our research design, because we want to test for the effects of changes in the institutional setting (macro-level condition), as well as dynamics of their effective usage and respective preconditions for usage (meso- and micro-level conditions). To assess the impact of changes of our conditions, data is collected for five different points in time, starting with 1996. Initially, all countries should have reached a stage of institutional consolidation of democracy, so that societal and political impacts of democratic procedures can be expected. To be able to assess the effects of our micro-level conditions, we pragmatically also had to take into account the accessibly of Latinobarómetro (starting from 1995), the World Bank’s Governance indicators (since 1996) and the Americas Barometer (starting 2004). Consequently, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 were assigned as points of analysis. We will consider each country for these five points in time as a case, so that we reach at a larger-N-sample of 70 cases. By looking at how these cases move over time, we can assess the way changes of our multi-level conditions infer on the outcome.

4.1 Why employ a fsQCA?

fsQCA gives us the opportunity to further qualify the degree of membership of our 14 cases in a certain set of condition (Ragin 2000: 180, Jacobs 2003: 139; Schneider/ Wagemann: 176-177). As our conditions involve complex and fine-grained theoretical concepts, by just dichotomizing (for csQCA) or categorizing (mvQCA) them, we would risk losing empirical
information. It is the “degree of (non-)adequate participatory structures” (according to our model, participatory and consensus mechanisms can be more or less adequate to a given societal context), as well as the “degree of organizational strength of ethnic groups” and their “degree of trust in public institutions” that we assume to determine, if societal conflicts are conducted by force or peacefully.

In particular, we see the necessity to calibrate our outcome at least on an ordinal or on a metric scale: At first, the way conflicts are regulated can be “violent” or “peacefully” (thus, reflecting the dichotomous logic for setting our 0.5-anchor). Secondly, we need to distinguish the degree of “violence” (from street blockades to more violent civil uprisings, going further to state repression and to overt conflict) and the quality of conceivable ways of “non-violent” interest articulation, such as (legal) demonstrations or strikes. Although the outcome may be qualified in terms of refined categories, too, a mvQCA-logic does not seem to lend a comprehensive evaluation method of our cases’ set-membership status in the outcome, as the dichotomous quality of being violent or not is crucial for us in qualifying the effect of our conditions.

4.2 Two different QCAs

Our data and the leading research questions gives room for two different directions in our research approach: We can either have a narrow approach that focusses more on the introduction of participation structures and their effect on the way conflicts are dealt with over time, leaving aside the different levels of potential of conflict per country. The other approach would also consider differences in societal pre-conditions leading to more complex results. Since both of these approaches will lead to interesting results and require different forms of QCA, we are going to discuss them in the following part.

The first option is to only test the effects of participation structures. Since we are collecting data for different points in time it is possible to compare how the introduction of participation structures and changes in the effectiveness of intermediary organizations to make use of these participation structures have affected the way domestic conflicts are conducted. The basic rationale relies on the empirical observation that the potential of conflict (ethnic diversity per country, national degree of socio-economic inequality) is unlikely to change rapidly over time. Therefore, we might remove it as a condition in our model.

This implies that only one question is important at the macro-level: How do existing participation structures match to the ideal participation structures for each country? We would still have to assess all data but are now able to reduce our range of conditions from the truth table. For the conditions at the meso- and micro-level there would be no changes.

The focus would be on the “x-axis”, looking at effects of the input that we primarily assume to vary over time. The time dimension is especially important here, since we focus on the effect of the introduction of specific new participation structures (see above). The leading research question of this approach is: How does the introduction, change, and usage of participation structures affect the way conflicts are dealt with?

The advantage of this narrow research approach is that problems of limited diversity in the QCA may be reduced. Furthermore, there is no need to calibrate inequality and ethnic fragmentation. The weakness of this approach is that we are only able to explain the effect of the introduction and change of participation structures und their effective usage, leaving
aside if the effects vary according to different ethnic and socio-economic background of each country.

If we want to have results that do not only explain the effect of the introduction of participation structures, but also hint how these effects differ according to the level of inequality and ethnic fragmentation, we need to adapt our research design. Since most of Latin American countries differ substantially in their composition, this approach could help us to draw a more detailed picture. We would have to integrate more conditions at the macro-level (social inequality, ethnic fragmentation) leading to a more complex QCA that has more country-comparative strength. The leading research question of this approach would be: Does the introduction and effective usage of participation structures lower conflicts, according to the societal context?

5. Outlook on Calibration

Before testing our causal model and accordingly being able to assess for necessity and sufficiency of our conditions, calibration presents a quite complex endeavor, as our research is based on an array of raw data collected for a variety of sub-dimensions and factors. In the following section we provide an outlook on how to structure and aggregate our data to best convert it into fuzzy-set-logic.

We are going to present our considerations on what kind of data is going to enter the calibration process for our outcome, as well as for each condition. As we are still collecting data, assigning definite fuzzy values is not yet completely feasible. Nevertheless, we attempt to illustrate our central rationales and conceivable calibration rules for some conditions (and the outcome) with some yet rather hypothetical examples.

For each set of conditions we are going to proceed as follows: Firstly, we attempt to clear up the central concept and our considerations that causally link it to our outcome. Subsequently, where yet possible, we will sketch the 0.5-threshold and furthermore delineate fuzzy set-scores, with reference to the respective raw data.

In general, we will need to split our three central blocks of conditions (potential of conflict, appropriate participation structures, and their effective usage) to more concise sub-conditions. On the one hand, this procedure seems to be legitimate for reaching at a more precise, combinatory explanation of our outcome. On the other hand, by engaging in a QCA with, possibly, up to 10 conditions, we run at risk of facing crucial problems of limited diversity. The logically feasible combinations of conditions will by large outnumber our maximum of 70 cases. To hold the number of logical remainders in our truth table as minimal as possible, the contribution of each condition to the outcome needs to be carefully discussed and reflected theoretically, and be justified by resorting to a priori-knowledge about our region of research.

5.1 Outcome: conflict regulation

At first sight, the outcome at the macro-level can easily be dichotomized: on the one hand conflicts are solved peacefully and discursive by societal actors within the political and legal structure. On the other hand conflicts may be dealt with non-peacefully beyond legal structure. But this type of conflict regulation has to be considered as a continuum of less or
more violent means. There is a wide range of possibilities from illegal protest like blockades, riots, rebellion or guerilla activity to civil war. Another possibility is violence between different societal groups (so called „intercommunal conflict“, Gurr 1993; Cleary 2000). Additionally, we want to include different forms of violence of the state against specific groups (cf. Cleary 2000; Gibney/Dalton 1996; Cingranelli/Richards 2010).

These different forms cannot be transformed into a dichotomy of peaceful vs. non-peaceful/violent. If we are interested to test whether an effective usage of participation structures reduces the amount of conflicts dealt with non-peacefully we have to apply a fuzzy-set logic for our outcome.

But measuring non-peaceful or violent conflict is not easy at all. There are different data bases related to our subject. The Political Terror Scale (PTS, Gibney et al. 2013) concentrates on state violence and gives a rather rough index about the amount of state violence on a five-category scale. The Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Project (CIRI) shares the same data sources. But besides presenting a nine-point scale of state violence there are also given scores for four subcomponents (cf. Wood/Gibney 2010): extrajudicial killings, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (cf. Gleditsch et al. 2002) is reduced on armed conflicts between the state and opposition parties and thus covers only a small part of non-peaceful conflicts. The Minorities at Risk Data Set (The Minority at Risk Projekt 2009) collects data for ethnopolitical groups. For each group also conflict related data like intracommunal conflict, intercommunal conflict, protest and rebellion, or repression by the state is documented by ordinal indices. Additional information is delivered in a qualitative manner. Monitoring instruments like the Observatorio latinoamericano de conflictos ambientales (OLCA) record the course of single conflicts.

When thinking about calibrating the outcome we have to consider two dimensions: the first is the type of violent / non-peaceful dealing with conflicts. We have to come to an ordinal scale of the different types in regard to their amount of violence with values between 0 and 1. The second aspect is a quantitative one to weight the different types: we have to consider the frequency of the different incidents but also their intensity. For this dimension a multiplicative weighting (sub)index by multiplying the frequency with the intensity has to be constructed.²

Formalized, the calculation of the outcome called amount of conflict (AC) can be calculated as followed:

\[ AC = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{W_t}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} W_i} \cdot v_t \]

- \( v_t \) are the values for the different types \( t \) of non-peaceful conflicts, ranging between 0 and 1.
- \( w_t \) are the weighting values for each type \( t \) calculated by multiplying the frequency \( f_t \) with the intensity \( i_t \), both ranging between 0 and 1.

² Additionally, we have to think about eventually integrating positively solved conflicts by effectively using (new) participation instruments as a third dimension.
By adding all $v_i$ weighted with their relative amount in relation to the sum of all types we obtain an index $AC$ ranging between 0 and 1. At the moment we don’t have a concrete measurement for all three components $v_i$, $f_i$ and $i_i$ to calculate $AC$.

For our second optional fsQCA, a threshold has to be set to transfer this new index into fuzzy-set scores. To set this threshold, we have to wait for first results to get an idea about the distribution of $AC$ over our 14 counties and five points of time.

For our first optional fsQCA, a more simple calibration can be applied. We are interested in the change of $AC$ over time. $AC_\Delta$ is the difference between $AC_i$ and $AC_{i-1}$. We can dichotomize this outcome by giving the value 1 for those cases, where $AC_\Delta$ is negative (i.e. conflicts are conducted less violent), and the value 0 for those cases, where $AC_\Delta$ is zero or positive (i.e. there was no change or conflicts are conducted more violent). Thus, for our fsQCA we have only four points of time and a total number of 56 cases.

### 5.2 Condition 1: Potential of conflict (macro-level)

Our main rationale to include "initial potential of conflict" (PC) as a context condition into the model rests upon the empirical observation, that the countries in our sample vary significantly with regard to the ethnic composition of their population and the degree of social inequality. In countries like Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and Mexico indigenous groups make up large parts of the population (up to 40%). In other countries they just constitute minor minorities, as in Chile for example (approximately 4%). As a peculiar ethnic group, Afro-Latin American people also shape the societal structure of some countries significantly, such as in Brazil or in Colombia. Furthermore, the way and the degree of the way these minority groups are affected by social inequality in a country, makes the initial setting even more complex.

Variance of this kind of societal context is commonly assumed to have a crucial effect on the intensity of conflict, and thus the prospects if conflicts can be regulated peacefully (Solimano 2004, Stewart 2010). Accordingly, as a conjecture there can be stated: "A higher initial potential of conflict enhances the chances that conflicts are conducted by force."

If we integrate "potential of conflict" per country as our initial condition, we have to take into consideration several sub-conditions along various dimensions and aggregate them cautiously:

Consequently, at first, we assess the degree of a) ethnic fragmentation for each country. Alberto Alesina (2003) developed a viable formula for calculating the degree of ethnic fractionalization per country.\(^3\) The Fractionalization Index (Alesina et al. 2003) is commonly utilized as a tool for assessing the potential of conflict in a country. Based on census data and complementary qualitative review we are going to compute our own fractionalization index for each country at our five points in time.\(^4\)

Furthermore, regional concentration of ethnic groups is commonly considered as a central factor that aggravates the potential of ethnic conflict in a country (z.B. Wolff 2009), and, in fact, the way ethnic groups are distributed in the countries also varies in our sample. In some

\(^3\) $FRACT_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_{ij}^2$, where $s_{ij}$ is the share of an ethnic group $i$ ($i = 1...N$) in a country $j$ (ibid.: 4).

\(^4\) Alesina et al.’s own index is based on data for Latin America, that is not congruent with current calculations of the share of ethnic groups in many countries (see f.i. Minorities at Risk, Cepalstat).
countries ethnic groups are highly dispersed (f.i. in Colombia and Nicaragua), whereas in other countries they constitute large regional majorities (f.i. in Bolivia). We are still in doubt, if (and how) we can, and if we need to include this characteristic of a country's ethnic composition into an aggregated index that qualifies the "initial potential of conflict". Anyhow, we are accounting for this property of the societal context when deducing the need of participation structures according to the given country context (see condition 2).

Overall, the structural "initial potential of conflict" per country is composed of ethnic diversity in conjunction with a country's degree of b) socio-economic inequality. Conveniently, we can rely on an array of raw data to assess the degree of socio-economic inequality per country: The Gini Index quantifies economic inequality based on differences of income distribution. Additionally, we also consider Vanhanen's Index of Power Ressources (2000). This rating additionally accounts for inequalities in land distribution, that play a major rule in constituting structural inequality in the Latin American region (Kay 2001). Beyond economic data, we also include various measures for assessing societal inequalities that may constrain citizens' capabilities to participate in the political process, such as inequalities in education and health. We also integrate data on literacy and life expectancy rates (accessible f.i. via HDI and Cepalstat).

In addition to this rather structural set of factors determining the potential of a) ethnic and b) societal conflicts, we need to qualify, if these forms of cleavages c) overlap in a country, thus, increasing the potential and intensity of conflict. To assess if and to what degree conflicts can turn out to become ethno-social conflicts, we rely on data that specify socio-economic indicators with respect to certain societal minority groups (f.i. unemployment rate of indigenous groups in relation to the national average, as well as wage differences and group specific poverty and literacy rates, sources: databases of Cepalstat and national census).

Taken altogether, our aim is to create an index PC to assign fuzzy set-scores to our cases for qualifying their membership in the set "initial potential of conflict" (f.i. "very low", "low", "high", "very high"). This index shall be a proper tool for accounting for the empirical variance of our Latin American countries:

\[
PC = (\text{ethnic fragmentation} + \text{societal inequality}) \times \text{overlap}
\]

5.3 Condition 2: Adequacy of the given institutional setting (macro-level)

For calibrating our central macro-level condition, we hold to the twofold logic that is implicit in Stoiber's (2011) model to distinguish between (2.I) an ideal set of group rights that may assure the political integration of minorities, and (2.II) specific mechanisms of consent and power-sharing for regulating decision-making processes (see figure 1). Consequently, our first sub-condition "adequacy of minority rights" qualifies if and to what degree necessary minority rights exist in a country. Certainly, we assume that this condition is not sufficient for guaranteeing non-violent conduct of conflicts. Collective rights for ethnic minority groups (f.i. ethnic quotas, autonomy provisions), in many cases, need to be supplemented by consensus mechanisms, as consociational theory suggests (f.i. proportional voting systems or required super majorities for decision-making processes in certain policy-field). Only these kind of mechanisms may level societal polarization and produce consensus (see the right side of graphic 1). Thus, our second sub-condition qualifies the membership of our cases to the set of "adequacy of consensus mechanisms". Notably, consensus mechanisms may also be
feasible in form of less institutionalized arrangements and more informal arrangements - a particularity that characterizes our Latin American context (Helmke/Levitzky 2006). Altogether, by splitting our main macro-level condition into two sub-conditions, we attempt to get precise insights on the necessity (and sufficiency) of adequate minority rights and/or of adequate consensus mechanisms for assuring non-violent conduct of conflict.

The ideal set of institutional arrangements (sub-condition 2.I and 2.II) will be deduced along Stoiber's model for each country. In a second step, this ideal set will be compared with the matching institutional framework of the respective country for our five points in time. Our main raw data are the country’s constitutional and legal texts. For assigning fuzzy set-membership scores to our cases, we need to take into account the adequacy of existing institutional arrangements, but also the degree of institutionalization of relevant legal guarantees. Autonomy provisions, for instance, very often do not reach far enough. In many countries, the autonomous competencies of ethnic territories that have been conceded some self-governing areas are restricted when it comes to central fields of policies, such as the management of natural resources on communal lands (f.i. in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Panamá). Another shortcoming of the design of autonomy regulations very commonly is their financial dependency on the central government's budget allocations (f.i. in Nicaragua). In the case of consultation rights, we very often have the crucial restriction that accords with ethnic groups remain non-binding, and therefore, this institutional device just offers a very weak form of veto-right (vgl. Schilling-Vacaflor 2012).

Setting the point of maximum ambiguity (0.5-threshold) is yet quite comprehensive for our sets "adequacy of minority rights" (MR) and "adequacy of consensus mechanisms" (CM). They can just be adequate or they are not. In addition to this dichotomous logic of qualification, the degree of (non-)adequacy has to be further quantified: We find it reasonable to assign fuzzy-set-scores in 0.2-intervals for sketching out the following set-membership-scores in our two institutional sub-conditions (for an illustration see table 1): "fully adequate" (fs-membership score =1), "mostly adequate" (fs-membership-score = 0.8), "more adequate than non-adequate structures" (fs-membership-score = 0.6), "limited adequacy" (fs-membership-score = 0.4), "very limited adequacy" (fs-membership-score = 0.2), "no adequate structures" (fs-membership-score = 0).

Table 1: Illustrative fuzzy set-membership scores for selected cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fuzzy set-membership in the set of:</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.I &quot;Adequacy of minority rights&quot;</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.II &quot;Adequacy of consensus mechanisms&quot;</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Argentina_ has a minor population share of 1% indigenous peoples. Some of them reside regionally concentrated. Thus, according to our model, limited autonomy rights and functional autonomy would be the ideal set of minority rights. There are just some cultural rights for indigenous peoples (f.i. the right to a bilingual education). There are no institutional provisions for assuring ethnic representation in one legislative chamber. An aggregated fuzzy set-score of 0.4 might be reasonable. When looking at consensus mechanisms, federal arrangements are in place to balance centralism and the economically dominant position of the Buenos Aires metropolis. We also have a proportional voting system. Consequently, for sub-condition 2.II a score of 1.0 may be assigned.

_Bolivia_: In Bolivia about half of the population is indigenous (48%), with a majority of them either Quecha or Aymara. Most indigenous live in one of the highland departments, where they constitute a regional majority. Even though polarization has decreased since ethnic mobilizations of 2009, Bolivia can still be considered as a highly segmented society with a strong regional cleavage between East (where most indigenous live) and West (where most non-indigenous live). Territorial autonomy would be adequate to deal with this regional conflict, while on the national level institutional provisions for regional consensus are needed. In this context territorial autonomy could be considered in terms of regions (departments). The new 2009 constitution of Bolivia offers territorial autonomy.
especially for indigenous communities, primarily on the local level. This is supports the inclusion of indigenous groups, but does not solve cleavages linked to the segmentation of society. Furthermore territorial self-governance does not include the management of natural gas or other fossil resources. Here indigenous communities only have the right to be consulted. Since the constitutional reform of 2009, 7 seats of the parliament are reserved for indigenous representatives. Altogether, we may sketch out a score of 0.6 in the set “adequacy of minority rights” and 0 in the set “adequacy of consensus mechanisms”.

Nicaragua: Although we also just have a small minority of approximately 4% of indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, some of them a regionally concentrated. In fact, they are also granted autonomous status, but the contemporary territorial design of the two legally recognized autonomous regions is not adequate anymore (Garífunas and mestizos nowadays dominate the areas). Another structural restriction is based on the fact that the autonomous regions are de facto not supposed to manage their natural resources. Financially, they are also highly dependent on the central government’s financial allocations (fs-score = 0.4). There are no power-sharing mechanisms, that would counter the dominance of the central state’s institutions and the economic monopoly of the Managua capital (score = 0).

Colombia: Colombia has a small share of indigenous groups (ca. 4%), that reside dispersed in the periphery of the country. Nevertheless, there are ‘light’ forms of (administrative) autonomy and collective land rights. Colombia was also one of the first states (1991) that institutionalized legal guarantees for its minority groups, such as the right for being consulted and ethnic quotas in parliament (fuzzs set-score = 0.8). We yet cannot say much about the quality of consensus mechanisms: As the capital remains politically and economically very dominant in relation to some peripheral, poorer areas, consensus mechanisms for assuring a higher leverage of the regions in national decision-making processes seem to be adequate. So far, we could not detect any kind of such instruments in the legal texts. Maybe there are some informal ones.

5.4 Effective usage of existing institutional structures?

5.4.1 Condition 3: Strength of intermediary organizations (meso-level)

For assessing if the institutional setting of a country can indeed be used effectively for channeling conflicting societal interests, we need to examine relevant intermediary organizations. Generally, a broad range of organizations is feasible, such as social movements, parties or communal associations that act on behalf of ethnic claims on the national or the regional level. Workers’ unions may also be of interest to us, if they are representing demands made by ethnic groups. Furthermore, peasant organizations may be relevant, if they claim to represent interests of indigenous (peasants).

Besides some databases that offer an overview on relevant civil society groups per country (f.i. Minority at Risk, CIVICUS), our main raw data consists of reports provided by Latin American country experts. Based on a comparative questionnaire, these reports will address the main characteristics of a set of sub-conditions that we identified as being central according to three main dimensions.

We asked our partners to treat features of the intermediary system with respect to their development over time, which is central to our purpose of research: This means, if there had been changes in the institutional design, the report should consider feasible, resulting effects on relevant organizations and on their interaction with public actors.

Yet, we propose three dimension for calibrating our main block of meso-level conditions. However, after a thorough analysis of the final reports, we plan to perform a factor analysis to check, if the identified sub-conditions are correlating with each other, and if they can be further aggregated.

“Strength of organizations” (SO) (3.1) may be our first sub-condition on the meso-level. In order to assign fuzzy set-scores to our cases on this dimension, various factors need to be aggregated relating to the guiding questions of the manual for the reports: (a) Are there any (and how many) organizations that pick up the demands of ethnic groups in order to channel
those into the political process? We also need to assess b) their strength and their size (f.i. by membership, but also mobilization capabilities and groups’ ability to seek alliances shall be examined). What (c) kind of further resources (financial resources, technical support or juridical expertise) do these organizations dispose for bargaining with the state? A coherent internal organization (d) may provide additional bargaining power toward public actors (f.i. by assured compliance based on hierarchical structures or a strong common identity?). There may be punctually strong, but very volatile organizations that just exert short-term influence ((e) stability).

On a second dimension the "degree of interaction with public actors" (IPA) (3.II) is assumed to have an effect on the way conflicts are conducted, too. First, the attitudes (a) of relevant organizations toward public institutions and the state need to be assessed. In Latin America, many ethnic movements debate on whether to accept the state as a legitimate negotiation partner at all. Some organizations prefer to act beyond the institutional setting and by choosing more confrontational means ((b) strategies).

A final sub-condition shall address the "degree of structural constraints" (SC) that may limit an effective participation (3.III), such as dominant informal structures like clientelism. We have some databases at our disposal to assess this kind of deficits of policy-making procedures, based on informal structures (a): the Governance indicators of the World Bank, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, as well as the BTI for assessing the degree of rule of law in a country. Additionally, we have asked our country experts for their assessment to further qualify the way informal constraints work (b): Are they mainly based on elitist structures or due to a lack of statehood, or both?

A more precise outline on how calibration could look like is yet not feasible, as the reports will be submitted by end of January. The validity of the data derived from the reports will be additionally checked by an extensive literature review.

5.4.2 Condition 4: Attitudes at the micro-level

As argued before, intermediary organizations are serving as link between citizens and the political institutions. Thus, success of intermediary organizations also depends on the attitude of citizens towards democracy and democratic institutions. On the micro-level we therefore have to assess the attitudes of citizens. The lesser the trust of citizens in the democratic performance the lower is the chance that relevant intermediary organizations will be established or their influence will grow (Stoiber/Knadt 2012; Fuchs 2003). If intermediary organizations do not have acceptance among the citizens in general, the effectiveness of democratic process for conflict solution is restrained. Democratic processes will only lead to a peaceful solution of conflicts, if all participants accept the mechanisms and results (Engstrom 2009: 159).

For us, especially the members of the ethnic groups are relevant. Our leading question is therefore: Do the different groups in society trust in the democratic mechanisms for conflict regulation?

The assessment of individuals' motivations and attitudes is not easy since it involves accessing a wide range of persons in order to be representative. For Latin America the last years have led to an advance for research, since cross-country survey programs have been
established, that make a comparison possible: Latinobarómetro and Americas Barometer. Since AmericasBarometer has only been established 2004 we can only use it for three points in time.

Latinobarómetro and AmericasBarometer have a variety of questions. Some of them are also concerning democracy in general and functioning of democracy in the respective country. Starting with 2004, we are able to use the results of both sources and therefore will have more profound results.

Latinobarómetro offers a question that is very relevant for our research purpose: “In general, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied, or no satisfied at all with the functioning of democracy in (country).” This question is included in all of the questionnaires for our research period. For the AmericasBarometer we find a question with almost the same formulation: “In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the way democracy works in Guatemala?” (LAPOP 2004) According to our assumption that trust in democratic process is most relevant this question is in the center of our interest.

Apart from the functioning of democracy in a country, we are also interested in the overall attitude of citizens towards democracy. There are several questions where the focus is aiming at democracy in general. E.g. one question addresses whether democracy is the most desirable form of government. A different question is asking whether democracy can solve problems. So the focus of questions about the general perceptions is varying. Most of these questions are answered in a yes/no condition. For our calibration a combination of more than one question concerning the general attitude towards democracy might be suitable.

Furthermore, the questionnaire of AmericasBarometer addresses trust in different public institutions and social organizations. Here trust in indigenous movements and political parties are addressed as separate questions. The answer has to been assigned to a value from 1 to 7. In this case we are able to further differentiate between trust in the institutions (macro-level), as well as trust in the intermediary organizations (meso-level).

As we cannot measure the specific trust into democratic mechanisms for conflict regulation, we have to use three proxies: As research conditions we can use general trust in democracy as first sub-condition, since it shows if citizens share the principles of democracy (“democracy” (TD)). The second sub-condition should deal with the functioning of democracy (“Satisfaction with the way democracy works” (SD)). A lot of citizens might share principles of democracy, but do not see that democracy in their countries is working according to these principles. As explained above, both questionnaires offer an according question. The third sub-condition is aiming at the “trust in intermediate organizations” (TIO). Here we can see, whether members of ethnic groups feel represented by intermediate organizations.

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5 Original question: “En general, ¿diría Ud. que está muy satisfecho, más bien satisfecho, no muy satisfecho o nada satisfecho con el funcionamiento de la democracia en (país)?” (Latinobarómetro 2008) translation by the authors.
5.5 Alternative calibration for the first optional model

According to chapter 5.1 looking only on the change of violent conflicts can dichotomize the outcome. Also for our conditions this logic may be appropriate. Our first condition (potential of conflict) can be dropped out of the model because of the assumption of being relatively constant. But for all other conditions a dichotomization is possible: If there is an improvement at time point t in comparison to t-1 the value 1 is given. If there is no improvement or a worsening of the condition the value 0 is given:

- If there are more adequate participation structures for minorities, MR = 1
- If there are more mechanisms of consent and power-sharing, MC = 1
- If the strength of organizations has increased, SO = 1
- If the extent of interaction with public actors has increased, IPA = 1
- If the degree of structural constraints has decreased, SC = 1
- If the general trust in democracy has increased, TD = 1
- If the satisfaction with the way democracy works has increased, SD = 1
- If the trust in intermediate organizations has increased, TIO = 1

In the end we would come up with a crisp-set QCA consisting of eight conditions to explain our outcome for 56 cases.

6. Bibliography


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