Präsenzveranstaltung

There will be an initial Zoom meeting for all seminar participants at the beginning of the semester (date to be announced shortly before the semester starts). Afterwards, we encourage each student to have one individual Zoom meeting with their instructor to talk about the (planned) topic of the seminar paper and its structure. In addition, there will be one or two more Zoom meetings for all students, and each student is encouraged to send some preliminary draft of the seminar paper to the instructor well before the seminar weekend, to get feedback from the instructor.

03.07.2023

Die Anmeldung erfolgt über WebRegIS

The topic assignment will take place a few weeks before the semester starts. Detailed information will be announced at this time.

Listed references serve as a first orientation:

• Ansolabehere, S. and Snyder, J.M. (2000). Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models. Public Choice, 103, 327-336.
• Aragones, E. and Palfrey, T.R. (2002). Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate. Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 131-161.
• Calford, E. and Oprea, R. (2017) Continuity, inertia, and strategic uncertainty: a test of the theory of continuous time games. Econometrica, 85, 915-935.
• van Damme, E. and Hurkens, S. (1999) Endogenous Stackelberg leadership. Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 105-129.
• Deneckere, R.J. and Kovenock, D. (1992) Price leadership. Review of Economic Studies, 59, 143-162.
• Deneckere, R.J., Kovenock, D., and Lee, R. (1992) A model of price leadership based on consumer loyalty. Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 147-156.
• Denter, P. (2021) Valence, complementarities, and political polarization. Games and Economic Behavior, 128, 39-57.
• Embrey, M., Frechette, G.R., Yuksel, S. (2018) Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 509-551.
• Groseclose, T. (2001) A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 862-886.
• Hamilton, J.H. and Slutsky, S.M. (1990) Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 2, 29-46.
• Hamilton, J.H. and Slutsky, S.M. (1994). Endogenizing the Order of Moves in Matrix Games. Theory and Decision, 34, 47-62.
• Hendricks, K., Weiss, A., and Wilson, C. (1988) The War of Attrition in continuous time with complete information. International Economic Review, 29, 663-680.
• Hoppe, H.C. and Lehmann-Grube, U. (2005) Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications. Journal of Economic Theory, 121, 30-50.
• Van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T., and van de Ven, J. (2020) Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts. Review of Economics and Statistics, https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00961
• Park, I.-U. and Xiong, S. (2020) An extensive-form representation of continuous-time games with reaction lag. Working paper.
• Simon, L.K. and Stinchcombe, M.B. (1989) Extensive form games in continuous time: pure strategies. Econometrica, 57, 1171-1214.
• Duggan, J. (2005) A Survey of Equilibrium Analysis in Spacial Models of Elections. Mimeo.