Prof. Dr. Robert Schmidt

(in the fields covered by the research center)

The Paris Climate Agreement is often viewed as inadequate to meet the global challenge of effective climate protection. This research project examines the problems of unilateral climate policy and identifies opportunities for a more effective climate cooperation in a global context. Unilateral climate policy can fail due to associated problems such as a loss of competitiveness for domestic industries and the potential relocation of companies. Such problems ultimately lead governments to strategically choose emission taxes and other instruments that are far too low. Therefore, an effective cooperation among different countries regarding climate protection is essential. Using game-theoretic models, we look at the conditions under which a stable climate agreement can be reached that provides legally binding and drastic emission reductions for the largest possible number of participating countries.

Furthermore, we examine the incentives politicians have to address climate change in the context of electoral competition. Climate researchers have been drawing attention to the risks of climate change and the need for political action for over two decades. Despite the fact that economic research has provided clear recommendations for action (e.g. effective carbon pricing as an incentive mechanism), politicians often fail to implement existing climate protection instruments. Therefore, a deeper understanding of potential political obstacles on the path to a more effective climate protection is just as important as a more precise understanding of the climate system.