Prof. Dr. Thomas Eichner
Photo: Hardy Welsch
Contact
Email: thomas.eichner
Institutional Affiliation
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Chair of Economics, esp. Finance
Additional information: Profile (in German)
Research Interests
(in the fields covered by the research center)
Although the climate goal of limit global to below 2°C compared to the pre-industrial level has now been accepted worldwide, a successor to the Kyoto Protocol with global cooperation seems extremely unlikely. This research project studies supply-side climate policies (carbon tax, mining trading system, reserve policy) and mixed supply- and demand-side climate policies as unilateral climate policies. General equilibrium models are being used to ascertain what contributions the named policies can make toward preventing severe climate damage, and in particular to complying with the upper limit set by politicians for global warming (the "Two degree target”). Taking intertemporal dimensions of climate change into account, analyses are being made of unilateral regulations based on: individual supply-side instruments, various mixtures of supply- and demand-side instruments, and emissions and capital taxation.
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(in the fields covered by the research center)
- Eichner, T., & Kollenbach, G. (2023). Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements: Investment Lags Matter. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 10(1), 33–53
- Eichner, T., Kollenbach, G., & Schopf, M. (2023). Demand- Versus Supply-Side Climate Policies with a Carbon Dioxide Ceiling. The Economic Journal, 133(652), 1371–1406.
- Eichner, Th./ Kollenbach, G./ Schopf, M. (2020): Buying versus leasing fuel deposits for preservation, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, in press.
- Eichner, Th./ Pethig, R. (2019): Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 94, 27–53.
- Eichner, T./Pethig, R. (2017): Buy coal and act strategically on the fuel market, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 99, October, pp. 77–92: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292117300661.
- Eichner, T./Pethig, R. (2017): Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits, in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 85, September, pp. 1–20: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617302413.
- Eichner, T./Pethig, R. (2017): Trade in fossil fuel deposits for preservation and strategic action, in: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 147, March, pp. 50–61: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272717300026.
- Eichner, T./Pethig, R. (2014): Self-enforcing environmental agreements, trade and demand- and supply-side integration policy, in: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 419–450: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/678517.
- Eichner, T./Runkel, M. (2012): Interjurisdictional spillovers, decentralized policy making and the elasticity of capital supply, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 5, pp. 2349–2357: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.5.2349.
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(in the fields covered by the research center)
Theoretical Foundations of Environmental Policy among Moral Consumers
The project is funded by the Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft e.V..
Empirical and experimental studies can demonstrate environmentally friendly actions by individuals. This behavior cannot be explained by the homo economicus concept of man that prevails in economics, but indicates that individuals have moral preferences or behave morally. Individuals with moral preferences will contribute more to the public commodity “environment” than homo economicus, but the market will still fail to optimally utilize resources that society is finding increasingly scarce. This research project uses general equilibrium analysis to examine how moral preferences affect the effects of environmental policy and to identify the optimal environmental policy. In the process, both closed economies and open economies with international trade relations and transboundary pollution are considered.
Seven specific work projects examine the influence of moral preferences on (i) emissions taxation and trading, (ii) optimal nudging, (iii) renewable energy subsidies, (iv) unilateral environmental policies, and (v) international environmental agreements.
